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CAN DEFENSE SAVE US?
This is never going to happen.
– House Speaker John Boehner in 2011, quoted in Bob Woodward’s “The Price of Politics”
… No enemy in the field has done more to harm the combat readiness of our military than sequestration.
– Defense Secretary James Mattis, June 12, 2017
Congress never loses its capacity to disappoint you.
– John Oliver, Comedian
T
he Hampton Roads economy is often caricatured as a three-legged stool, made up of defense spending, the port and tourism. However, depicting the 
region as a unicycle might be a more apt analogy. The port and tourism industries provide balance for the area, but defense 
spending is the impetus that moves the economy forward or pumps the proverbial brakes on economic activity. Hampton 
Roads’ reliance on defense spending means that changes in national security policy, force structure or technology can ripple 
through the regional economy. 
Undoubtedly, changes in Department of Defense (DOD) spending and strategy 
over the last two decades have led to the ebb and flow of the Hampton Roads 
economy. In the aftermath of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and the subsequent 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, direct defense expenditures in our region, after 
adjusting for inflation, increased from an estimated $15.3 billion in 2001 to 
$22 billion in 2011, an approximately 44% increase (Graph 1). For a time 
at the turn of the century, the regional economy outperformed that of the 
United States, boosting incomes, housing prices and employment. These rapid 
increases in DOD spending, however, tapered in the second half of the 2000s 
and real (inflation-adjusted) DOD spending peaked at $22 billion in 2011.
Several factors contributed to the slowdown and then outright decline in 
defense spending in Hampton Roads in the first part of the current decade. In 
Iraq, U.S. strategy shifted toward a drawdown and eventual (for a time) exit 
of combat forces in 2011. After peaking at about 100,000 troops in 2011, 
U.S. forces in Afghanistan rapidly fell to approximately 10,000 in 2015. 
While these shifts in deployments and strategy were important, the passage 
of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA) and implementation of the BCA’s 
discretionary spending caps in fiscal year (FY) 2013 played a much larger role 
in the slowdown of the regional economy. By 2018, direct defense spending 
in Hampton Roads was approximately $20.8 billion, 5.5% below its peak in 
2011. As defense spending stagnated, so did regional economic growth.
CAN DEFENSE SAVE US? 119
GRAPH 1
ESTIMATED REAL DIRECT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPENDING: 
HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2018
Sources: U.S. Department of Defense and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Estimates include federal civilian, military personnel and procurement and are adjusted for inflation to 2018 dollars 
with the urban consumer price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Hampton Roads’ dependence on defense spending means that the region 
must come to terms with the uncomfortable prospect that this spending will 
not continue to increase in perpetuity. First, the current increases in defense 
spending are not sustainable, given the fiscal imbalance of the federal 
government and the increasing dissatisfaction of the American public with 
what George Washington termed “foreign entanglements.” Almost 50% of 
Americans in a recent Pew Research Center survey responded that the U.S. 
“mostly failed” in Afghanistan and only 45% supported the initial decision 
to use military force there.1 Another Pew survey found a similar result for the 
conflict in Iraq, with over 50% of Americans responding that the U.S. “mostly 
failed” to achieve its goals in that country.2
Second, technological change may lead to a decline in some defense 
platforms (carriers) in favor of others (unmanned aircraft). The rise of 
autonomous airplanes, ships and submarines will likely reduce the number 
of personnel necessary to field and operate these weapons systems. Even 
before autonomous military ships and planes enter operations, technological 
advances are reducing the number of personnel needed to operate equipment. 
Simply put, fewer soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are needed to do the 
same job. 
Lastly, while some argue that sequestration will never occur again, as it would 
be too painful, we need only point out that similar arguments were made 
in 2012 and 2013. While the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2019 may 
effectively end the BCA’s spending caps, the deteriorating fiscal position of 
the federal government may revive the BCA in some form in the future. A 
prolonged recession would also place significant pressure on defense spending 
and calls to shift resources to more pressing domestic needs. Simply put, the 
good times may not last forever.
In this chapter, we examine the prospects for economic growth in Hampton 
Roads and how these prospects are intertwined with future defense spending. 
Challenges facing the region range from the absence of innovation to longer-
term trends in military and fiscal policy. The future defense environment will 
1   https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/05/after-17-years-of-war-in-afghanistan-more-say-u-s-
has-failed-than-succeeded-in-achieving-its-goals/.
2   https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/19/iraq-war-continues-to-divide-u-s-public-15-years-
after-it-began/.
also likely be more challenging, as these issues are connected. Undulations in 
defense spending are not new to Hampton Roads. Thus, we use history as our 
guide to understand how changes in defense spending may affect economic 
growth in the region and where we collectively might go from here.
The Bear In The Room: 
Threats To Defense Spending 
In Hampton Roads
Future defense spending in Hampton Roads is in danger of looking a bit like 
the bear markets many investors fear. The notion of a bear market comes from 
how bears attack, rising on their hind legs and swiping down at their victims. 
In this section, we examine several threats to defense spending in Hampton 
Roads that could perpetuate a bear market for the region.
THREAT ALPHA: DEPENDENCE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL 
AND PROCUREMENT SPENDING 
To many outside the region, Hampton Roads is simply a place many sailors call 
home. However, focusing solely on military personnel masks several important 
avenues of defense-related federal spending. Graph 2 shows the top 20 
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in 2017, based on the number of military 
and federal civilian personnel, excluding Washington, D.C. Only the San 
Diego MSA had more military service members residing in it in 2017, while 
only the New York City MSA had more civilian federal employees. In other 
words, the 57,000 federal civilian workers complemented the 81,000 military 
personnel stationed in Hampton Roads, making the region the third-largest 
combined federal workforce outside of the Washington, D.C., metro area. 
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GRAPH 2
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT: 
TOP TWENTY METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS IN TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT, 2017
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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Hampton Roads is more than just the home to 3% of the country’s military 
service members and federal civilian employees. Agencies in the federal 
government also contract with private-sector firms in the region to produce 
a wide range of goods and services. Graph 3 shows that these procurement 
contracts come overwhelmingly from the DOD, accounting for about 90% of all 
federal contracts. 
The mix of military personnel and DOD contracts puts Hampton Roads in 
a unique place among regions with a significant defense presence. Table 1 
indicates where Hampton Roads falls in comparison to several other areas 
known for their relationship with the military. Direct military expenditures 
accounted for about 17% of 2017 gross domestic product (GDP) in the region. 
While this may not rank us in the top 10 “military towns” nationally, we must 
note that many regions on the list are much smaller than ours. If we just 
focus on regions with a population of more than 1 million, 
Hampton Roads had the highest military dependence in 2017. 
In comparison, the San Diego MSA had 8% of its GDP coming directly from 
defense expenditures, while the Jacksonville, Florida, MSA had only 3%. The 
composition of defense spending is important. The regions that have a higher 
dependency on defense spending tend to focus on either military personnel or 
procurement spending. In contrast, defense spending in Hampton 
Roads is split evenly between personnel and procurement 
contracts with the private sector. While this may appear 
as a useful way to diversify the local economy within the 
defense sector, in reality, it threatens the region by making it 
susceptible to declines in either type of defense spending.
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GRAPH 3
PERCENTAGE OF PROCUREMENT SPENDING BY AGENCY IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2010-2017
Sources: USA Spending and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University 
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TABLE 1
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEPENDENCE BY METRO AREA, 2017






Personnel Share of 
Defense Spending
Procurement 










Jacksonville, NC 193,893 $          8,396 50% 88% 12% 1 1 16
Hinesville, GA 80,400 $          3,470 47% 84% 16% 2 2 13
Fayetteville, NC 386,662 $        17,263 32% 85% 15% 3 3 24
New London, CT 269,033 $        15,754 31% 11% 89% 4 33 1
Clarksville, TN 285,042 $        11,027 27% 84% 16% 5 4 29
Lawton, OK 127,349 $          5,155 23% 81% 19% 6 5 28
Killeen, TX 443,773 $        17,556 21% 87% 13% 7 6 50
Huntsville, AL 455,448 $        25,793 20% 4% 96% 8 63 2
Warner Robins, GA 191,779 $          7,163 19% 26% 74% 9 23 5
Destin, FL 271,346 $        14,404 18% 63% 37% 10 9 14
Amarillo, TX 264,925 $        13,695 18% 1% 99% 11 244 3
Sumter, SC 106,847 $          3,872 17% 76% 24% 12 7 31
Hampton Roads, VA 1,725,246 $        94,855 17% 48% 52% 13 16 8
Colorado Springs, CO 723,878 $        32,683 16% 64% 36% 14 10 18
Fort Knox, KY 150,430 $          6,275 15% 56% 44% 15 13 15
Tucson, AZ 1,022,769 $        39,034 15% 10% 90% 16 46 4
Columbus, GA 303,811 $        13,821 15% 80% 20% 17 8 46
Bremerton, WA 266,414 $        11,474 14% 63% 37% 18 12 23
Oshkosh, WI 170,414 $        10,511 11% 1% 99% 19 303 6
Hanford-Corcoran, CA 150,101 $          5,191 11% 82% 18% 20 11 68
San Diego, CA 3,337,685 $      231,845 8% 46% 54% 32 32 27
Jacksonville, FL 1,504,980 $        76,650 3% 49% 51% 71 47 83
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, USA Spending and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University 
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THREAT BRAVO: MAINTAIN, TRAIN AND ASSEMBLE, 
NOT INNOVATE AND CREATE
The roots of the military in Hampton Roads date back to just after the founding 
of the U.S. Department of the Navy in 1798. Soon after the end of the 
American Revolution, the Navy was looking for a shipyard to maintain and 
expand its fleet. In 1801, the Navy acquired Gosport Shipyard in Portsmouth, 
which remains in business today as the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The shipyard 
contributed to the Navy’s fleet by building one of the first six frigates. The 
private sector also had a hand in shaping the region’s naval maritime history. 
The most notable firm, Newport News Shipbuilding, which would become 
a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries, opened in 1886. By 1897, it had 
produced three warships for the Navy. 
However, it wasn’t until the beginning of the 20th century that Hampton Roads 
began to experience an influx of military personnel. The Navy needed to 
increase its manpower and the technical skills to operate its growing fleet. To 
train the next generation of sailors, it opened a training center in 1908, named 
St. Helena, in conjunction with the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Since World 
War I, the military’s presence has expanded in the region to the Peninsula 
with Langley Air Force Base and Fort Eustis; Sewell’s Point, the current 
home of Naval Station Norfolk; and Virginia Beach with Naval Air Station 
Oceana, among numerous others. Together, these military facilities have been 
responsible for operational support and training.   
This brief history of the genesis of the military in Hampton Roads provides 
several insights on defense spending in the region. The region’s historic 
forte in the defense industry has been to maintain, train and 
assemble. This strength has carried to the present. The military 
installations in the area continue to maintain equipment and 
train a variety of naval occupations, such as sailors, pilots 
and mechanics. On the other hand, many private-sector firms 
with DOD procurement contracts focus on support activities, 
to include maintenance and assembly. Of course, there are 
notable exceptions, including the shipyards that are building 
the new Ford-class carriers and Columbia-class submarines, 
and even these yards depend on lengthy, national supply 
chains.
Graph 4 gives the breakdown of DOD procurement contracts with the private 
sector in Hampton Roads for 2010 to 2017. The largest categories are in 
shipbuilding, along with maintenance, repair and rebuilding of equipment, 
which are often related to ships. Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) in Newport 
News is far and away the largest firm in these categories and accounts for the 
lion’s share of procurement contracts in the region. This facility is the nation’s 
sole designer, builder and refueler of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and is 
one of only two shipyards with the ability to design and build nuclear-powered 
submarines. 
This brings us to the challenge for the region. Hampton 
Roads’ competence in maintaining, training and assembling is 
clearly a useful component of the military industrial complex; 
nonetheless, it may not lend itself to creating innovation 
and entrepreneurship, which fosters economic growth. HII 
is undoubtedly the anchor of defense procurement here, but we must also 
recognize that it is larger than just its presence in Hampton Roads. In 2018, the 
gross revenue from all HII operations (with major facilities in Hampton Roads, 
Pascagoula, Mississippi, and San Diego, California) was about $7 billion. 
This means that the supply chain for HII’s operations here reaches far outside 
our region, curbing its local impact. Furthermore, it differs from anchors in 
other areas, like Microsoft or Amazon in Seattle, because HII does not spur 
the creation of new firms at the same rate. It is the creation of new firms that a 
number of researchers increasingly believe produces regional job growth.3 
Culture is a key driver in this process. Locales with an energetic 
startup and innovation culture tend to work from a paradigm where firms 
collaborate, cooperate and then compete. Firms collaborate on technology and 
innovation, and cooperate on policy and infrastructure, before the competition 
begins. Uber and Lyft, for example, exited the Austin, Texas, market together 
when faced with more stringent background requirements for drivers.4 
3   See, for example, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin and Javier Miranda, “Who creates jobs? Small versus large 
versus young,” Review of Economics and Statistics 95, no. 2 (2013): 347-361.
4   https://www.businessinsider.com/r-uber-lyft-spend-big-lose-big-in-texas-vote-on-driver-
fingerprinting-2016-5.
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GRAPH 4
BREAKDOWN OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTS BY CATEGORY: HAMPTON ROADS, 2010-2017
Sources: USA Spending and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
 4 
GRAPH 4 
Breakdown of Department of Defense Contracts by Category  
















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
All Other Catagories Ships, Small Craft, Pontoons, and Floating Docks
Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment Professional, Administrative and Management Support
Rescue, and Safety Equipment Construction, Maintence and Repair of Structures and Facilities
 4 
GRAPH 4 
Breakdown of Department of Defense Contracts by Category 
















2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
All Other Catagories Ships, Small Craft, Ponto ns, and Floating Docks
Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment Profes ional, Administrative and Management Sup ort
Rescue, and Safety Equipment Construction, Maintence and Repair of Structures and Facilities
  
 
r s:  i   t  r s t r f r i  l sis  li , l  i i  i rsit  
0
l i i l o l i
i i il i i si l i i i p
i i i i ili iance and Repair of Str ctures and Fac lities
■ 
CAN DEFENSE SAVE US? 127
The culture of defense procurement flips this paradigm on 
its head. Firms know the level of defense spending and see 
it as a zero-sum game, where one firm wins, and the others 
lose. The recent high-profile case involving a former Virginia 
state delegate shows the worst of this, where the only 
innovation seems to be the creative lengths firms will go to 
obtain contracts set aside for small and veteran-, women- 
and minority-owned businesses.5 Even when defense firms 
cooperate, it is to share the defense pie, not to innovate to 
make more pies. 
THREAT CHARLIE: LONG-TERM TRENDS IN MILITARY 
AND GOVERNMENT POLICY
There are also long-term trends at play pushing the military to become smaller, 
nimbler and smarter. In reality, the size of the active-duty force in the United 
States, shown in Graph 5, has been on a decline for decades. Furthermore, 
since the end of World War II, the Army, not the Navy, has typically seen a 
boost in personnel. Long-term trends, including fiscal pressure from rising costs, 
shrinking budgetary space and a changing threat environment, could influence 
the size of the defense establishment in Hampton Roads. These challenges 
do not exist in isolation of each other, but instead, magnify and build off one 
another.
There have been several major “budget deals” passed by Congress to suppress 
the full budgetary effect of the spending limits imposed by the Budget Control 
Act of 2011 (BCA). In the near term, the defense sector may have escaped 
the worst-case scenario, and the defense budget might see increases in the 
next several years. While this is good news, it should be tempered with the 
realization that policy actions like the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 and the 
Bipartisan Budget Acts of 2016, 2018 and 2019 have ballooned the national 
debt. This precarious fiscal situation is particularly notable because it is taking 
place during the most prolonged periods of economic expansion in recent 
history. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the federal government 
could spend more servicing the debt than supporting national defense by 
2025.6
5   https://pilotonline.com/news/local/crime/article_4e66fea6-4a4d-11e9-8506-c75ccfa08aba.html.
6  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/25/business/economy/us-government-debt-interest.html.
Dodging the BRAC Bullet
Hampton Roads has not been immune to the Department 
of Defense’s efforts to increase efficiency by closing and 
realigning military installations. Most notably, the 2005 
round of cuts by the Base Realignment and Closure 
Commission (BRAC) affected several Hampton Roads 
military installations. Fort Monroe was closed and designated 
a national monument. On the Peninsula, Fort Eustis and 
Langley Air Force Base were merged to create Joint Base 
Langley-Eustis, while in Virginia Beach, Joint Expeditionary 
Base Little Creek-Fort Story was formed from combining the 
Navy’s Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek and the Army’s 
Fort Story.
The 2005 BRAC also put in peril Naval Air Station Oceana 
and its 15,000 personnel in Virginia Beach. The commission 
voted to close Oceana and move its operations to Jacksonville, 
Florida, in part because of urban sprawl approaching the 
base. To preserve the base, local officials created development 
buffers around it. Hampton Roads dodged a bullet and should 
continue preparing for future BRAC rounds.
The Department of Defense is also using technology in a variety of ways in the 
face of rising costs of physical assets and fringe benefits (pension and health 
care) for DOD employees. For example, the DOD is substituting capital for 
personnel with the new Ford-class aircraft carrier. The new fleet carrier USS 
Gerald R. Ford uses about 700 fewer personnel than the previous-generation 
Nimitz-class carriers. Estimates suggest that the Ford class carriers will save 
more than $4 billion in ownership costs compared to the previous Nimitz-class 
carriers over their 50-year service life.7 
7  https://www.military.com/equipment/gerald-r-ford-class-aircraft-carrier.
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GRAPH 5
ACTIVE-DUTY MILITARY BY BRANCH OF SERVICE: UNITED STATES, 1954-2017
Sources: Defense Manpower Data Center and Department of Defense
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Active-Duty Military by Branch of Service: 
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Finally, the threat environment facing the military is evolving quickly in ways 
that could impact Hampton Roads. For instance, there is an increased reliance 
on technological solutions to future threats by leveraging automation, drones, 
special operations and cyber warfare. Furthermore, if the U.S. defense strategy 
continues to pivot toward Asia, there is an increased chance the region will 
lose an aircraft carrier group, along with the attendant active-duty military 
personnel and families, to the West Coast or Hawaii. 
We must also recognize that our competitors get a “vote.” Russia has become 
quite adept at using disinformation campaigns spread through social media. 
These campaigns, which aim to increase partisanship, highlight the burgeoning 
role of cybersecurity in future conflicts. China has aggressively moved to 
promote its interests within the “Nine-Dash Line” in the South China Sea. China 
also recently slashed its budget for ground forces, reinvesting the funds in its 
naval and air forces. China’s improvements in anti-ship missile technology and 
efforts to deny U.S. Navy ships access to ports in the region seek to undermine 
the value of carriers and other surface assets. Iran’s recent proclamation that 
it had flown unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over U.S. Navy ships in the 
Persian Gulf highlights the evolution of threats, from manned aircraft and ships 
to potentially a swarm of UAVs and malware aimed at critical systems.
These threats have serious implications for the Hampton Roads economy as it 
continues to be reliant on personnel and big gray ships. As such, any scenario 
that reduces shipbuilding or the number of active-duty military personnel will 
be detrimental to the region. For instance, it is possible that DOD expenditures 
could shift toward equipment and technology that are not produced in large 
quantities in Hampton Roads, such as drones (equipment) and information 
operations and warfare (technology). In terms of personnel, Table 2 shows 
how the average military and federal civilian worker’s compensation stacks up 
against other sectors. Federal employees represent the highest-earning group, 
and notably, federal civilian workers have experienced the largest inflation-
adjusted compensation increase from 2013 to 2017. To make up for the 
loss of each military service member, the region must generate 
2.2 private nonfarm sector, 3.5 retail or 1.2 manufacturing 
jobs. 
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED REAL AVERAGE COMPENSATION: SELECTED 
INDUSTRIES IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2013 AND 2017
Industry 2013 2017
2013 - 2017 
Percent 
Change
Private Nonfarm $     43,598 $      43,686 0.20%
Manufacturing $     79,538 $      79,597 0.07%




$     62,515 $      51,817 -17.11%
Federal Civilian $   104,031 $    116,737 12.21%
Military $     97,461 $      96,358 -1.13%
State and Local $     60,470 $      66,130 9.36%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Compensation of Employees by NAICS Industry 
Note: Values are adjusted for inflation to 2018 dollars by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Urban Consumer 
Price Index.
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Defense Spending Through 
A Historical Lens
The region’s collective reliance on federal government personnel and 
procurement spending makes it susceptible to boom and bust cycles akin to 
those of resource-rich states like North Dakota and Texas, whose economies 
fluctuate based on the price of oil. Graph 6 shows the undulations in 
government spending on national defense since World War II after adjusting 
for inflation. It is not hard to see that defense spending is often driven by 
geopolitics on the world stage. Many of us can name the recent events that 
have driven the growth and subsequent declines of defense spending, such as 
the Vietnam War, the so-called peace dividend in the early 1990s and 9/11.
In this section, we’ll examine how two recent declines in defense spending 
impacted the Hampton Roads economy – the thawing of the Cold War in 
the late 1980s and the Budget Control Act of 2011. These two case studies 
differ in time period, cause and, importantly, in magnitude. The rising defense 
spending of the post-9/11 era represents “the good,” while together the 
Budget Control Act of 2011 and the thawing of the Cold War in the late 1980s 
provide a view of “the bad” and “the ugly” scenarios for Hampton Roads. 
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The Bad: The Budget 
Control Act Of 2011
“Each non-exempt account within a category shall be reduced by a dollar 
amount calculated by multiplying the enacted level of sequestrable budgetary 
resources in that account at that time by the uniform percentage necessary to 
eliminate a breach within that category” (Section 101 of the Budget Control 
Act of 2011, modifying Section 251(a)(2) of the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985).
Sequestration is equivalent to a four-letter word to many in Hampton Roads, 
responsible for the ills that could beset the region again. Sequestration entails 
removing or “sequestering” funds that have been approved by Congress and 
signed into law by the president. Sequestration occurs when the president, 
acting in accordance with the law, withholds appropriated funds to ensure that 
obligations do not exceed a specified threshold. Imagine if you went to the 
grocery store with $100 to purchase items on your list. While at the store, you 
not only withheld $20, thus reducing the amount of groceries you bought, but 
you then put the $20 in a shoe box, not to be opened until next year. In a way, 
sequestration withholds discretionary funds which cannot be spent in the fiscal 
year and thus “expire” and return to the U.S. Treasury.
The most recent episode of sequestration started as a threat to induce a 
bipartisan deficit reduction strategy in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. 
After failed negotiations by the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction 
– colloquially, the Supercommittee – the BCA spending caps led to the 
sequestration of funding in discretionary defense and nondefense programs 
in FY 2013. Further, the BCA of 2011 limited spending growth in subsequent 
years. Congress has modified the spending caps on several different occasions. 
However, these adjustments only provided temporary relief and increased 
uncertainty about future spending.
Graph 7 shows how the BCA of 2011 impacted federal personnel and 
procurement spending in Hampton Roads. The region continued to experience 
the long-run trend of declining numbers in the military. However, there 
was an uptick in federal civilian employees that offset some of these losses. 
Nonetheless, from 2011 to 2017, federal (military and civilian) 
employment declined by 3.3%. DOD procurement spending 
peaked at $10.4 billion in 2011 and had declined $1.8 billion 
to about $8.6 billion by 2014. By 2017, DOD procurement 
spending was approximately $8.9 billion, 15% below the 
2011 peak.
Due to the relatively small decline in federal employment from 2011 
to 2017, we’ll focus our attention on the $1.8 billion decline in DOD 
procurement spending from 2011 to 2014, as this was a “shock” to the 
regional economy. Table 3 shows a breakdown of the major sectors that 
acquire DOD procurement contracts in the region. Manufacturing, which 
includes shipbuilding, repair and maintenance, accounts for over half of 
all procurement contracts in the region. Several large players in the region 
dominate this category, like Huntington Ingalls and BAE Systems. Table 3 also 
shows how defense procurement spending in each industry changed from 
2011 to 2014 and 2017. Manufacturing and professional, scientific and 
technical services (PSTS) experienced the most significant overall declines by 
2014. PSTS contacts rebounded by 2017, but unfortunately, manufacturing 
spending continued to decline.
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GRAPH 7
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT AND REAL PROCUREMENT SPENDING: HAMPTON ROADS, 2010-2017
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, USA Spending and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Procurement spending is adjusted for inflation to 2018 dollars with the 
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TABLE 3
DEFENSE PROCUREMENT SPENDING IN HAMPTON ROADS BY INDUSTRY (IN BILLIONS OF $), SELECTED YEARS





Construction $621.7 $513.2 $558.9 -$108.5 -$62.8
Manufacturing $5,839.6 $5,227.6 $4,588.2 -$612.0 -$1,251.5
Wholesale Trade $831.6 $541.2 $970.3 -$290.4 $138.7
Transportation and 
Warehousing
$359.4 $427.4 $328.7 $67.9 -$30.7




$1,790.8 $1,213.4 $1,773.3 -$577.4 -$17.5
Administrative, 
Support and Waste 
Management
$223.5 $182.2 $235.8 -$41.4 $12.3
Health Care and 
Social Assistance
$131.5 $147.3 $129.3 $15.9 -$2.2
All Other Industries $482.4 $208.5 $177.6 -$273.8 -$304.7
Total - All Industries $10,447.0 $8,575.1 $8,884.9 -$1,871.9 -$1,562.1
Sources: USA Spending and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are adjusted for inflation to 2018 dollars with the urban consumer price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
I I I I I 
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The Economic Impact Of 
The BCA On The Economy 
Of Hampton Roads
The total economic impact of defense spending on the Hampton Roads 
economy is made up of the primary and secondary economic impacts. To 
visualize how the economy reacts to a change in procurement contracts it 
is helpful to imagine a pebble dropped into a pool of water. The impact 
represents the initial round of economic activity – output, earnings and 
employment from DOD procurement funds flowing to firms in the region.  
However, the initial round of economic activity moves through the economy 
like the ripples of water created by the pebble. These ripples represent the 
interconnectedness of the local economy. They are often broken down into 
indirect and induced impacts. The indirect economic impact is made up of 
economic activity by suppliers to firms that have won DOD procurement 
contracts, while the induced impact comes from income and employment in 
industries directly and indirectly affected by the direct procurement contracts. 
Due to these spillovers, the economic impact of procurement spending in 
the region can be much larger than the direct impact on a firm that wins a 
contract. Attempts to quantify the total impact of a change in economic activity 
often use an economic multiplier. For example, if a firm wins a $100,000 
DOD contract (direct impact) that generates $30,000 in indirect economic 
impacts and $20,000 in induced economic impacts, then the economic impact 
multiplier effect is ($100,000 + $30,000 + $20,000) / $100,000 = 1.5. 
There are two important considerations when thinking about economic 
multipliers. First, the size of the multiplier inherently depends on how much of 
the economic activity continues to recycle within the region. If, for example, 
shipbuilding and repair firms source most of their materials from outside 
the region (a “leakage”), then the actual multiplier effect will necessarily be 
smaller. Second is the multiplier effect, where spending spillovers to a variety 
of other sectors are beneficial to the region when the direct impact is positive; 
however, by the same token, it is painful when there is a reduction in direct 
economic activity.
To estimate the impact from DOD procurement spending on employment 
and output in the Hampton Roads economy, we use the defense procurement 
spending data in Table 3 and JobsEQ software developed by Chmura 
Economics and Analytics. The JobsEQ software uses regional input-output 
tables to measure the connectedness of economic activity in the region.
Graph 8 displays the total economic impact of DOD spending on output in 
Hampton Roads, while Graph 9 shows the impact on employment. To measure 
the impact of the BCA of 2011, we look at defense spending levels in 2011 
before the imposed reduction in defense spending, and compare it to 2014 
and 2017. 
In 2011, the $10.4 billion in direct DOD procurement spending created a total 
output of $15 billion. This level plummeted in 2014. Direct defense spending 
dropped to $8.6 billion, resulting in an overall decline in economic activity in 
the region of $2.7 billion. To put this into context, this represented an almost 
3% drop in Hampton Roads’ $95 billion economy at the time.
As one might expect, the $10.4 billion in DOD procurement spending in 2011 
created a significant number of jobs. In 2011, DOD procurement spending 
in Hampton Roads directly created over 43,000 jobs and rippled throughout 
the economy to create another 28,000 jobs. By 2014, however, the estimated 
impact of DOD procurement spending on employment fell from almost 
72,000 total jobs in 2011 to slightly more than 58,000 jobs. The decline in 
DOD procurement spending undoubtedly contributed to the region’s overall 
economic malaise during the first half of this decade. The good news is that the 
most recent data highlight recovery in the number of jobs attributable to DOD 
procurement spending, with almost 64,000 jobs attributable to this spending 
in 2017. With the recent increases in DOD spending and budgets in FY 2018 
to FY 2020, it is likely that employment associated with DOD procurement 
spending in Hampton Roads will increase into 2020, if not 2021.
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 2019136
GRAPH 8
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT SPENDING ON OUTPUT IN HAMPTON ROADS
Sources: USA Spending, JobsEQ and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 8 
Estimated Economic Impact of Defense Spending on Output in Hampton Roads 
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GRAPH 9 
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT SPENDING ON EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS
Sources: USA Spending, JobsEQ and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
 9 
GRAPH 9  
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The Ugly: The Cold War 
Thaws And Defense 
Spending Falls  
Following more than a decade of relative stability after the Vietnam War and 
the changing geopolitical landscape associated with the thawing Cold War, 
Congress had an initial goal to reduce military spending by at least 25% 
between FY 1987 and FY 1997.8 
Graph 10 shows how the overall decline in military spending corresponded 
to federal employment (military and federal civilian) and DOD procurement 
spending in Hampton Roads from 1983 to 2000. Both federal personnel 
and procurement spending peaked in the late 1980s at $5.4 billion, 
140,000 service members and more than 53,000 federal civilian employees. 
The thawing of the Cold War and reduction in defense spending came 
down particularly hard on Hampton Roads. From 1988 to 1998, 
procurement spending dropped by 45%, while military and 
federal civilian personnel fell by 25% and 15%, respectively. 
While sequestration was bad, it pales in comparison to 
the drawdown from the Cold War. Winter indeed came to 
Hampton Roads, to paraphrase a popular television series. 
To measure how this drawdown in defense spending 
affected Hampton Roads, it is important to understand the 
“counterfactual,” or “but for the drawdown, how would the 
economy have performed over time?” 
Economist Ben Zou,9 in the Journal of Labor Economics, measured how the 
drawdown in personnel and expenditures over this period affected economic 
activity. Zou used a statistical technique to elicit the counterfactual for areas 
with substantial defense spending. We use Zou’s methodology to examine the 
actual growth rate and the growth rate that would have taken place without 
8   Albert H. Schroetel, 1993, “Military Personnel: End Strength, Separations, Transition Programs and 
Downsizing Strategy,” Adjusting to the Drawdown Report of the Defense Conversion Commission, 
Washington, D.C. 
9   Ben Zou,  2018, “The Local Economic Impacts of Military Personnel,” Journal of Labor Economics, 36(3), pp. 
589-621.
the defense drawdown for civilian employment and income in Hampton Roads. 
We present these results in Graphs 11 and 12.
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 10 
GRAPH 10 
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GRAPH 10
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT AND REAL PROCUREMENT SPENDING: HAMPTON ROADS, 1983-2000
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census Bureau. Procurement spending is adjusted for inflation to 2000 dollars, with the urban consumer price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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GRAPH 11
GROWTH IN CIVILIAN INCOME AND THE COUNTERFACTUAL: HAMPTON ROADS, 1980-1998
Source: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
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GRAPH 11 
Growth in Civilian Income and the Counterfactual:  
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GRAPH 12
GROWTH IN CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT AND THE COUNTERFACTUAL: HAMPTON ROADS, 1980-1998
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The first thing to note in these graphs is that both civilian employment and 
income increased over this period. However, the gap between the actual 
outcome (blue line) and the counterfactual (orange line) after 1988 shows the 
effect of the decline in spending on defense. In general, despite rising 
civilian income and employment, Hampton Roads should 
have grown at a much higher rate than it did. To add some 
perspective, the region’s civilian income grew over 4% less and 
civilian employment grew over 5% less each year than they 
would have without the military spending cutback. 
The post-Cold War case study also again illustrates why context is critical. As 
William Mezger, a senior economist at the Virginia Employment Commission 
during this time period, put it: “Probably one of the reasons the defense 
cutbacks have hurt, but haven’t hurt as much as they did after World War 
II or the Korean War or even after Vietnam, when there was a period when 
the economy was stagnant for a couple of years, has been the expansion in 
the overall economy.”10 Hampton Roads didn’t just dodge a bullet, 
it dodged the mother of all economic bombs, because the 
drawdown took place during a period of widespread economic 
growth. We may not be so lucky next time. 
10   T. Evanoff, (Jan. 8, 1996), “Federal Job Reduction Little Noticed in the Area,” The Virginian-Pilot, Business 
Weekly, p. 4. 
Where Does This Leave Us? 
Where Do We Go 
From Here?
There are a variety of threats to defense spending in Hampton Roads, and 
as our historical case studies have shown, declines in federal procurement 
spending and personnel can have problematic implications for the region. Is it 
time to bring two other “four-letter words” into the conversation: diversification 
and collaboration? There has been a reluctance to utter these words, in fear 
that the DOD might view any such efforts as a withdrawal of support for 
the military installations in the region. Others have argued that it’s time for 
conversation and action. Where do we go from here? 
First, it is helpful to recognize that long-term structural threats 
often require long-term structural solutions. The risks we have 
outlined suggest that with or without action, the region could 
lose either personnel or procurement contracts, or both. The 
worst-case scenario would be to lose an installation in a future BRAC round.  
In this light, the region needs to continue to be forward-looking to protect our 
current military assets and become a net winner in inevitable future BRAC 
rounds. Work in this area is already taking place on a variety of fronts. For 
instance, the military is in the business of moving large numbers of people 
and equipment. The widening of I-64 through the Peninsula and the planned 
Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel expansion alleviate DOD congestion concerns. 
These projects have the bonus of making the region more attractive to 
businesses and residents.
However, sea level rise remains the elephant in the room 
concerning long-term structural issues facing the region and its 
military assets. It is a significant threat that could make assets 
at the region’s naval bases “float away” to other areas. There 
is unlikely to be one panacea to insulate the region from rising seas. Instead, 
local governments should continue to explore creative ways to invest in resilient 
infrastructure, such as so-called green bonds. Hampton Roads came out of 
the latest hurricane season relatively unscathed compared to metropolitan 
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areas in neighboring states, but it is only a matter of time before a devastating 
hurricane makes its way to our shores, and preparation is vital.  
Another piece to the puzzle to make the region more attractive to the military is 
its appeal to military personnel and families. We have some stiff competition in 
this department from the likes of San Diego. While we cannot compete directly 
in terms of climate, we can invest in K-12 education, promote policies to 
enable the hiring of military spouses and provide job training and placement 
for transitioning service members. Furthermore, the exiting military cohort is a 
prime source of workers in high-tech industries such as cybersecurity and data 
analytics.
Second, the region should promote policies that encourage 
innovation and entrepreneurial activities. Research shows that 
innovative firms act as the engine of economic growth in an 
area.11 This would represent a cultural change for our region. Hampton 
Roads missed out on the entrepreneurial waves that swept across many areas 
of the country in the early and late 1990s. We missed out, in part, because 
defense spending was strong, and the region continued to flourish even if it 
was not creating the new technologies implemented by the military. However, 
for the region to grow its firms, it needs to move past the model of winning 
government contracts by simply “buying low” in wholesale markets and 
“selling high” to the military.
Promoting innovation and an entrepreneurial spirit among 
Hampton Roads residents again is a long-term play. We suggest 
two strategies to promote an entrepreneurial culture and economic growth. 
First, to promote technology-oriented startups, and not miss the next wave of 
entrepreneurism, the region should continue to develop innovation districts. 
There are several innovation districts spread throughout the region, like the 
Peninsula Technology Incubator in Hampton, Ignition in Williamsburg and 
Innovation Research Park at Old Dominion University. These organizations help 
fuel the growth of startups by providing resources, expertise and mentorship, 
as well as inspiring a culture of entrepreneurship. 
11   For example, see Ryan Decker, John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin and Javier Miranda (2014), “The role of 
entrepreneurship in US job creation and economic dynamism,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 28(3), 
3-24.
The second strategy, often referred to as “economic gardening,” is designed to 
grow existing firms. While attracting mega firms like Amazon might produce 
front-page headlines, the overall payoff from luring a large firm to relocate can 
be quite low. Gardening, on the other hand, focuses on the needs of existing 
firms, whether it involves additional financial capital or technical expertise to 
expand their business. Our local colleges and universities also can play an 
essential role in research and development, as well as provide appropriate 
business services to budding companies.
A crucial aspect of this for Hampton Roads is the notion of 
dual-use products and services. The region already has experience and 
expertise in procuring government contracts. However, firms would also benefit 
by looking for outlets for their products in the private sector. For example, a 
firm working on the next generation of marine propulsion equipment might 
have developed its technology initially for the military, yet it could also be 
valuable in private-sector applications. The military-to-civilian transition is 
important also for private firms and business lines and for spurring innovation. 
All economic parties come to an end. While Hampton Roads cannot control 
poor fiscal choices at the federal level, it can recognize, plan and prepare for 
the eventual fallout. There are, as we have stated in previous reports, no magic 
bullets or short-term elixirs to fix these structural issues. If the road ahead is full 
of potholes, sometimes it is best to slow down and evaluate whether there is a 
better path. Undoubtedly, Hampton Roads will continue to play a keynote role 
in national defense in years to come. Now, however, is the time to broaden our 
horizons and make the cultural and economic changes needed to spur long-
term growth. 

